The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States ended its

report stating that "We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have

recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate." In this spirit, we the

undersigned wish to bring to the attention of the Congress and the people of the United

States what we believe are serious shortcomings in the report and its recommendations.

We thus call upon Congress to refrain from narrow political considerations and to apply

brakes to the race to implement the commission recommendations. It is not too late for

Congress to break with the practice of limiting testimony to that from politicians and toplayer

career bureaucrats—many with personal reputations to defend and institutional

equities to protect. Instead, use this unique opportunity to introduce salutary reform, an

opportunity that must not be squandered by politically driven haste.

Omission is one of the major flaws in the Commission’s report. We are aware of

significant issues and cases that were duly reported to the commission by those of us with

direct knowledge, but somehow escaped attention. Serious problems and shortcomings

within government agencies likewise were reported to the Commission but were not

included in the report. The report simply does not get at key problems within the

intelligence, aviation security, and law enforcement communities. The omission of such

serious and applicable issues and information by itself renders the report flawed, and

casts doubt on the validity of many of its recommendations.

We believe that one of the primary purposes of the Commission was to establish

accountability; that to do so is essential to understanding the failures that led to 9/11, and

to prescribe needed changes. However, the Commission in its report holds no one

accountable, stating instead "our aim has not been to assign individual blame". That is to

play the political game, and it shows that the goal of achieving unanimity overrode one of

the primary purposes of this Commission’s establishment. When calling for

accountability, we are referring not to quasi-innocent mistakes caused by "lack of

imagination" or brought about by ordinary "human error". Rather, we refer to intentional

actions or inaction by individuals responsible for our national security, actions or inaction

dictated by motives other than the security of the people of the United States. The report

deliberately ignores officials and civil servants who were, and still are, clearly negligent

and/or derelict in their duties to the nation. If these individuals are protected rather than

held accountable, the mindset that enabled 9/11 will persist, no matter how many layers

of bureaucracy are added, and no matter how much money is poured into the agencies.

Character counts. Personal integrity, courage, and professionalism make the difference.

Only a commission bent on holding no one responsible and reaching unanimity could

have missed that.

We understand, as do most Americans, that one of our greatest strengths in

defending against terrorism is the dedication and resourcefulness of those individuals

who work on the frontlines. Even before the Commission began its work, many honest

and patriotic individuals from various agencies came forward with information and

warnings regarding terrorism-related issues and serious problems within our intelligence

and aviation security agencies. If it were not for these individuals, much of what we

know today of significant issues and facts surrounding 9/11 would have remained in the

dark. These "whistleblowers" were able to put the safety of the American people above

their own careers and jobs, even though they had reason to suspect that the deck was

stacked against them. Sadly, it was. Retaliation took many forms: some were

ostracized; others were put under formal or informal gag orders; some were fired. The

commission has neither acknowledged their contribution nor faced up to the urgent need

to protect such patriots against retaliation by the many bureaucrats who tend to give

absolute priority to saving face and protecting their own careers.

The Commission did emphasize that barriers to the flow of information were a

primary cause for wasting opportunities to prevent the tragedy. But it skipped a basic

truth. Secrecy enforced by repression threatens national security as much as bureaucratic

turf fights. It sustains vulnerability to terrorism caused by government breakdowns.

Reforms will be paper tigers without a safe channel for whistleblowers to keep them

honest in practice. It is unrealistic to expect that government workers will defend the

public, if they can't defend themselves. Profiles in Courage are the exception, not the

rule. Unfortunately, current whistleblower rights are a cruel trap and magnet for

cynicism. The Whistleblower Protection Act has turned into an efficient way to finish

whistleblowers off by endorsing termination. No government workers have access to jury

trials like Congress enacted for corporate workers after the Enron/MCI debacles.

Government workers need genuine, enforceable rights just as much to protect America's

families, as corporate workers do to protect America's investments. It will take

congressional leadership to fill this hole in the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.

The Commission, with its incomplete report of "facts and circumstances",

intentional avoidance of assigning accountability, and disregard for the knowledge,

expertise and experience of those who actually do the job, has now set about pressuring

our Congress and our nation to hastily implement all its recommendations. While we do

not intend to imply that all recommendations of this report are flawed, we assert that the

Commission’s list of recommendations does not include many urgently needed fixes, and

further, we argue that some of their recommendations, such as the creation of an

‘intelligence czar’, and haphazard increases in intelligence budgets, will lead to increases

in the complexity and confusion of an already complex and highly bureaucratic system.

Congress has been hearing not only from the commissioners but from a bevy of

other career politicians, very few of whom have worked in the intelligence community,

and from top-layer bureaucrats, many with vested interests in saving face and avoiding

accountability. Congress has not included the voices of the people working within the

intelligence and broader national security communities who deal with the real issues and

problems day-after-day and who possess the needed expertise and experience—in short,

those who not only do the job but are conscientious enough to stick their necks out in

pointing to the impediments they experience in trying to do it effectively.

We the undersigned, who have worked within various government agencies (FBI,

CIA, FAA, DIA, Customs) responsible for national security and public safety, call upon

you in Congress to include the voices of those with first-hand knowledge and expertise in

the important issues at hand. We stand ready to do our part.

Respectfully,

1. Castello, Edward J. Jr., Former Special Agent, FBI

2. Cole, John M., Former Veteran Intelligence Operations Specialist, FBI

3. Conrad, David "Mark", Retired Agent in Charge, Internal Affairs, U.S. Customs

4. Dew, Rosemary N., Former Supervisory Special Agent, Counterterrorism &

Counterintelligence, FBI

5. Dzakovic, Bogdan, Former Red Team Leader, FAA

6. Edmonds, Sibel D., Former Language Specialist, FBI

7. Elson, Steve, Retired Navy Seal & Former Special Agent, FAA & US Navy

8. Forbes, David, Aviation, Logistics and Govt. Security Analysts, BoydForbes, Inc.,

9. Goodman, Melvin A., Retired Senior Analyst/ Division Manager & senior fellow at the

Center for International Policy, CIA

10. Graf, Mark, Former Security Supervisor, Planner, & Derivative Classifier,

Department of Energy

11. Graham, Gilbert M., Retired Special Agent, Counterintelligence, FBI

12. Kleiman, Diane, Former Special Agent, US Customs

13. Kwiatkowski, Lt Col Karen U., Veteran Policy Analyst, USAF-DoD

14. Larkin, Lynne A., Former Operation Officer, CIA

15. MacMichael, David, Former Senior Estimates Officer, CIA

16. McGovern, Raymond L., Veteran Analyst, CIA

17. Pahle, Theodore J. Senior Intelligence Officer (Ret), Defense Intelligence Agency,

Office of Naval Intelligence, and U.S. Army Intelligence

18. Sarshar, Behrooz, Retired Language Specialist, FBI

19. Sullivan, Brian F., Retired Special Agent & Risk Management Specialist, FAA

20. Tortorich, Larry J., Retired US Naval Officer, US Navy & Dept. of Homeland

Security/TSA

21. Turner, Jane A., Retired Special Agent, FBI

22. Vincent, John B., Retired Special Agent, Counterterrorism, FBI

23. Whitehurst, Dr. Fred, Retired Supervisory Special Agent/Laboratory Forensic

Examiner, FBI

24. Wright, Col. Ann, Retired Reserve Colonel & Former US Diplomat, US Army,

25. Zipoli, Matthew J., Special Response Team (SRT) Officer, DOE

CC: Senate & House Intelligence Committees

Senate & House Judiciary Committees

Senate & House Armed Services Committees

Senate & House Government Reform Subcommittees